Geduldig v. Aiello (1974)

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided in a six-to-three decision in Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), hereafter Geduldig, that pregnancy-related disabilities could be excluded from state-run disability insurance programs and that discrimination based on pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination. Carolyn Aiello, a woman denied disability benefits in California since her disability was pregnancy-related, and three other women facing similar discrimination, sued Dwight Geduldig, director of the California Department of Human Resources Development for violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under California’s Unemployment Insurance Code at the time, conditions or disabilities that arise from or are related to a pregnancy were excluded from coverage. Aiello and the other women argued that by not insuring pregnancy-related disabilities, the state was unfairly discriminating against women. Geduldig detached pregnancy discrimination from the injustices uniquely faced by women by determining that civil rights law did not apply to pregnancy status, exacerbating the inequality women in the United States face in employment, education, and economic opportunity.

1. Background and Context
2. Scrutiny Considerations
3. The California Case
4. Arguments Before the Court
5. The Court's Decision
6. Legacy and Impact

Background and Context

Geduldig involves a disability insurance program the state of California began during the 1940s. Workers in California paid into the program through their salaries and would receive benefits in return if they became disabled and were temporarily unable to work. The program covered a wide variety of disabilities, including recovery from elective and cosmetic surgeries. California Unemployment Insurance Code section 2626, however, specifically excluded from the program all disabilities related to, or caused by, a pregnancy during and for twenty-eight days following the pregnancy. That rule remained unchallenged until the 1970s, when it affected Aiello and the three other women involved in the Geduldig case.

The four women who comprised the class in Geduldig were from low-income backgrounds and lost their jobs in the summer of 1972 expressly because of complications during pregnancy. Aiello was a single woman and sole income earner who worked as a hairdresser. In June 1972, Aiello experienced an ectopic pregnancy, which is when a fertilized egg implants outside of the uterus and can be life-threatening if left untreated. She underwent a surgery that terminated the pregnancy. During recovery her doctor told her that she would be out of work for around five weeks, which is when Aiello applied for disability insurance benefits. A second woman, Augustina Armendariz, a secretary, was the sole income earner for herself, her husband, and her child. In May 1972, she experienced a miscarriage that took her out of work for nearly a month, which led her to apply for relief through the state’s disability insurance program. Elizabeth Johnson was also the only income earner supporting herself and her five-year-old son. Johnson experienced a tubal pregnancy, which is an ectopic pregnancy that implants into the fallopian tube, or the tube that connects the ovaries and uterus, and had emergency surgery that terminated the pregnancy. Finally, Jacqueline Jaramillo supported her husband and child on her income. Jaramillo experienced a pregnancy and birthing process without atypical complications. However, the physical consequences of even a normal pregnancy caused Jaramillo to be temporarily unable to work. The State of California denied all four women disability insurance that summer, after which they filed a class action lawsuit, which is a lawsuit where multiple people bring the same or a similar case coalesced into one group, based on gender discrimination. Geduldig, the director of the California Department of Human Resources Development, was responsible for representing the state of California during the lawsuit.

Several similar sex-discrimination cases passed through the US judicial system contemporary to Geduldig. In 1971, the Supreme Court unanimously found in Reed v. Reed (1971) that an Idaho law giving preference in inheritance administrator appointments to male over female relatives was unconstitutional. Reed v. Reed was one of the first instances of the Supreme Court striking down a law that discriminated against women. Following Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court decided in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) that a federal law granting benefits to dependents of male Air Force officers, but not dependents of female officers unless their husbands were at least fifty percent dependent on them, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Three judges involved in the Frontiero v. Richardson decision also upheld the scrutiny standard of review for sex-discrimination from Reed v. Reed.

Scrutiny Considerations

One legal concept focused on in certain justices’ opinions in Geduldig and similar cases is scrutiny. Scrutiny is a legal practice where judges analyze potentially discriminatory laws with varied levels of suspicion based on the classification of people claiming discrimination. When laws negatively affect classifications of people who have historically experienced significant legal discrimination, such as racial minorities and women, the government must demonstrate greater levels of justification for maintaining the laws. However, not all classifications require the same level of scrutiny.

Intermediate scrutiny falls between strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, and rational basis review, the lowest level. The judges from Reed v. Reed employed the rational basis standard for review. The rational basis standard for review only requires there to be a reasonable state interest in upholding the law, such as avoiding financial or administrative burden on the state, rather than a compelling interest, which includes laws that would seriously jeopardize the public health if repealed. Rational basis review applies to cases of discrimination of classes such as disability and age. Additionally, the burden of proof that a law is discriminatory falls on the individual or class alleging discrimination, rather than on the government. Finally, strict scrutiny is the highest form of scrutiny and applies to cases of discrimination of classes such as race or religion. To pass strict scrutiny, the state must prove that they have a compelling interest in keeping the law, and the law itself must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Aiello’s team in Geduldig argued that sex discrimination, which at that time typically only required intermediate scrutiny, should require strict scrutiny, on par with other classes of discrimination such as race. During the time of Geduldig, lawyers continued to debate and shape the scrutiny classification for sex discrimination. As of 2024, laws discriminating against women fall under intermediate scrutiny, which requires the government to prove it has an important objective in having the law, and the law must be substantially related to furthering that objective.

The California Case

In 1972, Aiello and the three other women brought a class action lawsuit against the state of California. The women sought an injunction, or a temporary pause, to enforcement of the California statute. California law requires that a district court three-judge panel review any case that seeks an injunction of a state statute. The three-judge panel convened in 1973 to review the lawsuit. The attorneys on behalf of the Aiello class argued that the state statute discriminates against pregnant women. Two of three judges on the panel for Aiello’s case found that the statute unfairly discriminated against pregnant women and found no rational or substantial state interest in upholding the law restricting coverage. If allowed to stand, this ruling would have compelled the state of California to amend their law excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from the disability insurance program.

Around the same time the district court considered Geduldig, Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1973), hereafter Rentzer, a case in the State of California Court of Appeals involving the same statue at question in Geduldig, determined that the pregnancy exclusion statute could only exclude disabilities resulting from typical pregnancies, and not conditions such as an ectopic pregnancy. That meant individuals who experience an ectopic pregnancy are entitled to disability benefits. Rentzer opened up the question of whether three out of the four women who alleged discrimination in Geduldig still had a reason to sue, since their disabilities were now covered by the state law. After the Rentzer decision, the California Department of Human Resources Development appealed to the Geduldig panel to reconsider its decision on their case, which they refused. The department then appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.

Arguments Before the Court

Before the Supreme Court, Joanne Condas, a deputy attorney general for California, represented the state of California. Wendy Williams, an attorney who specialized in sex discrimination, represented Aiello and the other women in the class. Condas began arguments by explaining the financial reasons California excluded women from the disability insurance program. She recounted estimates from the district court arguments that including pregnancy and pregnancy-related disabilities in the state’s disability insurance program would cost an additional $120 million annually. She explained that California was only the second state to establish such a program, behind Rhode Island. With Rhode Island as a model, Condas explained that California lawmakers identified two key concerns in their program. Rhode Island did not prohibit people with disabilities from collecting money from worker’s compensation in addition to the disability insurance, and it included pregnancy as a covered disability. In less than three years after establishing the program, Rhode Island went from having a $2.7 billion state budget surplus to a $1.5 million budget deficit. Hoping to avoid such an outcome, California excluded pregnancy from the program and did not allow people to receive benefits from both workers compensation and the disability insurance program. However, Condas noted that complications from pregnancy were eligible for coverage due to changes in the statute in the prior year. She also noted that women make up a disproportionate percentage of the disability insurance claims, despite contributing less to the fund than men due to lower average wages, which she argued justified exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the program.

Condas then stated her five arguments for why the state had an interest in maintaining the law excluding normal pregnancies. The first was the solvency of the program, secondly pregnancy is generally voluntary and can be planned, thirdly pregnancy-related disabilities generally last longer than other disabilities covered by the program, fourthly she states that medical professions have different medical standards and are more likely to be conservative in how long a woman must stay home during and after pregnancy, and finally there is a significant disparity in the work return rate following pregnancy compared to other disabilities.

Williams began her testimony by stating that she did not intend to argue that pregnancy itself was a disability. Instead, she believed that the medical complications resulting from a pregnancy that interfere with work should be covered just as any other disability would. She noted that the California program did not exclude any other disability on the grounds of it being voluntary, too costly, unique, or predictable. The program covered recovery from voluntary cosmetic procedures and sterilization, costly disabilities like heart attack recoveries, sex- or race- specific disabilities like prostatectomies and sickle-cell anemia, and predictable disabilities such as degenerative arthritis, which inevitably progresses. Looking at the opposing argument, she rebutted Condas by stating that the financial argument for keeping the policy is invalid since the analysis made by the district court found that the program could cover women with only nominal changes to the program structure. Then, looking to the Rhode Island disability program, she points out that one of the reasons for the high costs was that Rhode Island paid pregnant women regardless of whether they became disabled as the result of their pregnancy. She claims that the desire to save money is not sufficient reason to exclude a suspect class, which is a classification of people likely to be subject to discrimination, from an assistance program. She based her argument on Shapiro v. Thompson (1968), which found that a state cannot implement a residency requirement for welfare programs simply to save money. She continued by stating that allowing the law to stand would be permitting economic discrimination against women due to their physiological experiences birthing children. Laws discriminating against pregnancy, she argued, continue to relegate women to a subordinate economic position, preventing them from reaching equal footing with men in the workplace. She concluded by stating that legislation targeting pregnancy finds its roots in sexist stereotypes and must be scrutinized as potentially sex discrimination.

The Court’s Decision

The majority decision, authored by Justice Potter Stewart, and joined by Justices Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, Warren Burger, Lewis Powell Jr., and Byron White, finds that California had a rational basis for excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from the disability insurance program. Stewart begins the decision by outlining the history and process of the disability fund. He notes that there are several exclusions to the program, such as disabilities that last fewer than eight days without hospitalization or more than twenty-six weeks. According to Stewart, since three of the four women in the case, including Aiello, experienced disability as a result of an abnormal pregnancy complication, the decision in Rentzer moots, or makes it no longer relevant for a court to consider, the case for those three women since they were no longer discriminated against under the California law. The fourth woman, Jacqueline Jaramillo, applied for benefits due to disabilities resulting from a normal pregnancy. Stewart claims that the Court only considered Jaramillo’s case when coming to a decision on the constitutionality of the statute.

The majority primarily focused on the financial aspect of including pregnant people in the disability insurance program. The attorneys for the state of California argued that they had a substantial interest in maintaining the program in the current form. Estimates for including pregnancy-related disabilities approximated $100 million a year. The lower court panel argued that such a sum could easily be covered with some structural changes including an increase in how much employees must pay into the program before receiving benefits as well as a slight reduction in the maximum benefits. However, the majority in the Supreme Court found that the state had a rational interest in maintaining the current structure and could not be compelled to change it. Although the case involved a class of sex discrimination from its earliest lawsuits, the majority gave little focus to the issue. The only mention of sex is found in a footnote. The majority states that the program does not discriminate against women, rather only against those with a specific condition or disability, that of pregnancy. According to the majority, two groups exist, pregnant women, which only includes one sex, and non-pregnant persons, which includes both sexes. Since women can be in both the pregnant and non-pregnant categories, the law did not discriminate based on sex.

Justice William Brennan, Jr. wrote the minority decision, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Douglas. Brennan begins by outlining the majority’s reasoning, and explaining that based on Reed and Frontiero, a higher level of scrutiny is required, and a mere rational reason for maintaining the law was not sufficient. He explains the disability program, along with its purpose and uses, stating that the law does not differentiate between planned and unplanned disabilities, such as a cosmetic procedure compared to a sudden heart attack, of which both are covered. He further explains that disabilities wholly or mostly experienced by a particular race or sex, such as sickle cell anemia or prostate removals, are all covered by the program. He then explains how pregnancy involves the exact same risks to health as other covered conditions and requires visits to the doctor or hospital. Furthermore, economic concerns related to pregnancy are common, which is the exact problem the disability fund was created to alleviate. Additionally, he states that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a government agency that oversees the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, includes pregnancy-related discrimination as violative of Title VII in their official guidelines. Stewart states that the Supreme Court, in similar cases of alleged sex discrimination, applied a level of strict scrutiny that extends beyond only economic bases. He then challenges the majority, stating they give no justification for the sudden change in this case to a lower level of scrutiny.

Legacy and Impact

After the Supreme Court released the decisions in Geduldig in 1974, the legal community roundly derided the majority for the reasoning of their argument. However, the Supreme Court continued not to find discrimination based on pregnancy as sex-based discrimination in future cases. In the five years following Geduldig, over two dozen law journals published articles criticizing the majority. Legal scholars, including women’s rights attorney and eventual Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, published law review articles criticizing the reasoning of the court. Even primary defenders of the majority decision admitted that the court erred in refusing to classify the discrimination as sex-based. In 1976, the Supreme Court considered General Electric Company v. Gilbert (1976), which involved a private company’s disability insurance plan that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities. Using Geduldig as precedent, the Court found once again that discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex-based and, in that case, did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In response, the United States Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex including pregnancy and related medical issues. As of 2024, section 2626 of the California Code Unemployment Insurance Code includes illness and injury resulting from pregnancy as eligible for disability insurance compensation.

Since Geduldig, sex discrimination has not been a viable argument in cases relating to pregnancy leading to advocates using other arguments on issues relating to sex and gender, such as the right to privacy. The American Civil Liberties Union, a non-profit legal services organization that represents clients on issues such as restrictions on speech, voting rights, and abortion, generally discourages abortion cases to use sex discrimination claims after Geduldig. As such, abortion jurisprudence following Geduldig near exclusively disregards equal rights protection in favor of a privacy justification. The Supreme Court established the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which protected access to contraceptives under the implied right to privacy in the Constitution. Since then, cases involving many different subjects, including contraceptives, abortion, and homosexual relations also avoided equal protection arguments. Gay rights cases, such as Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), in which the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia ban on oral and anal sex, generally use privacy arguments rather than equal protection. However, in the 2022 case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, the Supreme Court found that abortion access is not a protected right found in the Constitution, nor does there exist an implied right to privacy. That departure overturned nearly a half century of abortion jurisprudence. With the right to privacy argument no longer tenable, and dubious odds of effectively arguing for equal rights violations because of the Geduldig decision, abortion and other similar issues have few, if any, barriers preventing their overturning by future Supreme Court cases. While federal law supersedes the ruling in Geduldig, the Supreme Court has not overturned the case as of 2024, meaning protection against pregnancy discrimination is not considered a constitutional right by US courts.